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ABSTRACT
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERPRETIVE STANDARDS FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
(Under the direction of Professor John Winkle)

Understanding the interpretive standards of constitutional law is as

important as knowing the actual words of the Constitution. In order to structure its

rulings and stabilize the law, the Supreme Court develops interpretive standards

that allow the Constitution to be as applicable today as it was over 200 years ago
at its creation. These tests also give the justices a reliable framework by which to

shape future rulings. The evolution of interpretive standards for the Establishment

Clause, the first clause of the First Amendment, is particularly important because
of the ambiguous language of the clause and the political passions that are evoked

in matters of church and state. Establishment Clause interpretation has gone

through several stages of evolution since the first Establishment Clause case,
Everson v. Board ofEducation of the Township ofEwing, in 1947. Understanding

this development is the key to comprehending the Establishment Clause itself,
because the ultimate power of the clause lies in its interpretation by the Court.
Examining such an evolution is a valuable way to evaluate the prudence and

consistency of past Supreme Court rulings and to predict the direction of future
Court decisions.

This study will trace the evolution of interpretive tests for the

Establishment Clause from Everson through the recent Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

case. The first chapter will consider the wording, objectives, and purposes of the
framers of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The second chapter

will analyze four important rulings that show the creation of and reliance on the

“Lemon Test” and its modification by an endorsement standard. The third chapter
will examine the decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which ruled school vouchers unconstitutional. An
appellate focus will help to frame the facts and legal arguments of the case and to

provide an alternate and opposing majority opinion to that issued eventually by the
Supreme Court. The fourth chapter will look at the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in an effort to

explain the most recent step in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause and

to demonstrate the impact of previous cases on the decision. Finally, this study
will conclude with an analysis of the results and current state of Establishment

Clause interpretation as a result of the Zelman case.
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Introduction

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”1

This simple phrase, known as the Establishment Clause, of the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution has prompted some of the fiercest debates and
most complex analyses in American constitutional history. Its interpretive
tensions stem from the ambiguous intent of the First Amendment’s framers. At

the very least, the Establishment Clause was designed to keep the Congress from
establishing and financing a national church or religion. At most, the

Establishment Clause was intended to erect a “wall of separation” between
government and religion, where the federal government would have absolutely no
involvement in the affairs of any religion and no religion would have any role in

the dealings of the federal government.1
2

The body responsible for deciding this and all constitutional questions is
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the high court has offered varying

opinions since its first encounter with the Establishment Clause in 1947. As in
many other constitutional issues, the Court has created and employed interpretive
tests with regard to the Establishment Clause to provide some stability for its

opinions and guidance for lower courts and public officials. These tests set basic
standards for pieces of legislation, or other actions by the government, to
1 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1, sec. 1.
2 Linder, Doug. “Introduction to the Establishment Clause.” On-line database. University of MissouriKansas City School of Law Website, 2002. Accessed 5 November 2002.
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/estabinto.htm. p. 1.

1

determine if they square with the Establishment Clause and pass constitutional

muster. Should a law or policy fail to satisfy any element of an applicable

interpretive test, it is struck down as unconstitutional. The Court’s reliance on
interpretive tests causes them to carry the force of the Constitution, as if the tests

themselves were literally contained within the Constitution.

Interpretative Philosophies and Strategic Decision-Making

The study of constitutional law requires an intensive examination of the

Supreme Court's interpretive tests because these tests make a tremendous
difference in the meaning and application of the Constitution. The tests

themselves, however, are subject to change by the Court, and thus, constitutional
interpretation can evolve over time depending on the political and ideological

composition of the majority of the Court. Justices may extend, retract, or

completely replace interpretive tests and their application, at will, by their
opinions. The evolution of interpretive standards for the Establishment Clause is
especially susceptible to changes in Court composition because of the wording of
the clause and the ideological passions evoked by matters of church and state.

Understanding this evolution requires a detailed examination of the landmark

cases in the progression of interpretive standards of the Establishment Clause.

There are two primary schools of thought that animate judicial
interpretation. Both philosophies have their strengths and weaknesses, and both

2

have impacted the evolution of Establishment Clause interpretive standards.
Textualism, or originalism, holds that the Constitution should be applied as the
framers originally intended with as little variation as possible. Textualist justices
create interpretive tests in an attempt to preserve the framers’ intent of the
Constitution. These justices believe that progressive thought has no place in

constitutional interpretation and that creativity should be left to the legislative and
executive branches of government, so long as this creativity does not violate the

original meaning of the Constitution or the Amendments. Textualism’s greatest
weakness is its inherent limits on review and application. A textualist believes

that matters of law not mentioned specifically by the Constitution should not be
considered by the Supreme Court and, thus, are not eligible for judicial review.

The other primary school of thought important to the evolution of
constitutional tests is experientialism. This adaptive approach to interpretation

assumes that the Constitution is a “living document” that is meant to adjust in
meaning and scope over time to meet the needs of American society. The framers

could not have possibly envisioned all possible controversies, and they readily

admit that, for example, through the passage of the Ninth Amendment.

Experiential justices assert that many rights and liberties are protected by the
Constitution even though they are not enumerated, such as the right to privacy.

These justices believe that many matters of law can be reviewed by the Supreme

Court. Experientialism's greatest flaw is the extensive liberties and powers it
would give to the judicial system if left unchecked. A pure experientialist would

3

argue that nearly all legislation is susceptible to judicial review and can be
reviewed on the basis of an ever-changing notion of the Constitution. The

combination of both these theories has helped develop an interpretation of the

Establishment Clause that allows for some interactions between church and state,
such as minting coins with the National Motto (in God we trust), while forbidding
others, such as organized prayer in public schools. An understanding of these
constitutional philosophies is needed in order to fully understand the process of
interpretational evolution and to comprehend the methodology of the justices of

the Supreme Court.

The Zelman Announcement

The most recent installment to the High Court’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause came on June 27,2002. The courtroom was filled to

capacity as the justices filed into the chamber. The vast majority of those who had
stood in line for three hours to obtain a seat in the courtroom (including myself)

were there to hear one decision: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.3 Better known as
the school vouchers case, Zelman was billed as the most important decision of the

2002 Term. For months before the release of the decision, countless political
analysts and court watchers speculated on how the justices would rule and what

lasting effects the decision would have. The constitutionality of school vouchers
3 Jacob Dickerson. Visit to the Supreme Court on June 27, 2002.
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had become a hotly debated national policy issue. Predominantly defended by
conservatives and denounced by liberals, school vouchers divided rank-and-file
Republicans and Democrats as much as any issue since abortion. The only

consensus was that the ruling would come down to a close vote, as the justices of

the current Court are relatively evenly split on issues of politics and constitutional

philosophy.

Traditionally, as the justices announce their rulings, they do so in rank
order of tenure on the Supreme Court. Usually, each justice writes and gives at

most one majority opinion during each decision release session. June 27 was no
exception as the justices reported the final decisions of the term. When only the

Zelman case remained to be reported, two justices had not participated: Associate
Justice John Paul Stevens, who is seen as an experientialist and a political liberal
at least in the context of the current Court; and Chief Justice William Rehnquist,

who is something of a textualist and a member of the conservative bloc on the
Court. The result of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris would arguably be revealed by
way of who presented it, even before he could finish his first word. Finally, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist began to speak for the Zelman majority, there was a rare

breach of silence in the courtroom as audible sighs of disgust and relief could be
heard.

The Supreme Court ruled five-to-four that the school vouchers program

in question in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris did not violate the Establishment Clause,
thus overturning ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

4 Jacob Dickerson. Visit to the Supreme Court on June 27, 2002.
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The Evolution and Importance of Establishment Clause Interpretation

Establishment Clause cases have been some of the most watched and

analyzed cases to come before the Supreme Court since Everson v. Board of
Education of the Township ofEwing in 1947, and the tests that have arisen in these

cases are among the most important in the study of constitutional law. The
hallmark Establishment Clause interpretation test is the so-called “Lemon Test,”

fashioned in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971. It requires that governmental actions

with some effect on religion serve a secular purpose, neither advance nor inhibit

religion, and not excessively entangle the government with religion.1 These tenets
of Lemon were shaped by Court precedents, combining less comprehensive tests
that were formed by earlier Court rulings. Since its formation in 1971, the

“Lemon Test” served as the primary Establishment Clause interpretive test until it
was modified by the “Endorsement Test,” a variation and reorganization of the

“Lemon Test,” in Agostini v. Felton in 1997. How has the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause interpretive standards evolved from Everson v. Board of
Education of the Township ofEwing in 1947 to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in

2002, and what effect did this evolution have on constitutional theory? Did the

Supreme Court ignore stare decisis, its self-imposed tradition of following its own

1 Longley, Robert. “The Six Constitutional Commandments.” On-line database. About.com U.S.
Government Info/Resources, 2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa052600b.htm. p. 1.

precedents, or did the High Court merely continue the evolutionary development
of the Establishment Clause in its Zelman decision. Finally, is the majority

opinion defensible and consistent in Zelman, and how durable is this ruling?
In order to answer these questions, an examination of legal philosophy and
case law is necessary. As all matters of constitutional law begin with the original

text of the Constitution, the foundation and first chapter of this study will consider
the wording, objectives, and purposes of the framers of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. The second chapter will analyze the four most important

cases, leading up to the Zelman case, in the evolution of interpretive tests for the

Establishment Clause. These cases are Everson v. Board ofEducation of the
Township of Ewing (1947), Walz v. Tax Commission of the City ofNew York
(1970), Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), and Lynch v. Donnelly (1984). While there

are many important Establishment Clause rulings, these four were chosen because

each significantly advances or redefines the progression of interpretive tests for
the Establishment Clause. This coverage includes the facts of the cases, an

analysis of the arguments, and the effects of the decisions on the evolution of
interpretive tests. The third chapter will examine the decision of the U. S. Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which ruled school

vouchers unconstitutional. This appellate focus will help to frame the facts and
legal arguments of the case and to provide an alternate and opposing majority

opinion to that issued by the Supreme Court. In turn, the fourth chapter will look
at the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Zelman v.
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Simmons-Harris in an effort to explain the most recent step in the interpretation of

the Establishment Clause and to demonstrate the impact of previous cases on the
decision. Finally, this study will conclude by addressing the questions posed in

the previous paragraph. This paper is strictly a study of constitutional
interpretation and will not try to assess the public good or practical merit of school
vouchers and other issues before the Court. This paper will rely primarily original

case documents and their reproductions in order to provide a textual examination

of the evolution of the interpretation of the Establishment Clause.

8

Chapter I: Framers’ Intent and the Establishment Clause

The first consideration when examining the evolution of the Establishment

Clause is the intent of the framers of the First Amendment. To know how and
why the meaning of the Establishment Clause has evolved over time, it is

important to establish its beginnings. After all, framers’ intent plays a role in the
classic and competing theories of constitutional interpretation. It is the primary

focus of the textualist theory of constitutional interpretation, and it is a point of

departure for the experientialist argument for the advancement of an adaptive
approach.

The framers did not necessarily rank the Bill of Rights in order of

importance, but a right that has no superior is the first mentioned: freedom from
a law respecting an establishment of religion.”1 At the very least, the framers of

the First Amendment feared, and with good historical reason, the potential that the
United States government might one day enact laws to prefer one religion over

another and limit religious freedom. However, when taken literally, the
Establishment Clause was written to do little more than that and, in the view of

some scholars does not create a “wall of separation” between religion and

government.

7

1 Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Bill ofRights. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. p. 79.
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Some members of the First Congress doubted the need for the

Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. Many prominent early leaders
such as Alexander Hamilton asserted that the new Constitution did not grant the
Congress the power to regulate religion, so there was no need for a protection

against a nonexistent potential for abuse. Freedom of religion and minimal
separation of church and state were inherent in the free society created by the
Constitution. In The Federalist, Hamilton declared, “for why declare that things

shall not be done which there is no power to do,”1 when he wrote about the
debates concerning the First Amendment. Other leaders, however, such as James

Madison and Thomas Jefferson believed in the need for a strict safeguard of the
separation of church and state and that, if left formally unrestrained, the federal
government could one day violate this separation. In the end, Madison, Jefferson,

and their supporters succeeded in bringing that sentiment to the Establishment

Clause and placing it before the First Congress for ratification.

The language of the Establishment Clause propagates the evolution of its
interpretation because the meaning of “an establishment of religion” is unclear.

Prohibiting an establishment of religion could be understood in multiple ways: as
not showing preference to any one religion over another, as not creating an official

state religion, or as not preferring religion over non-religions. To James Madison,
the father of the Bill of Rights, it clearly meant more. Madison believed that

religion should be a completely private endeavor, with no interference from
1Levy. Quoting Alexander Hamilton, p. 81.
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government. Non-preferential treatment to all sects was not enough. When

arguing against a Virginia bill that would have levied taxes to subsidize all instate
religions, Madison declared that religion was not “an engine of civil society,” and

that direct government subsidies for religion, funded by public taxes, differed from
the Inquisition only in degree. ’ Madison later spoke of a “perfect separation”

between church and state, believing that “religion and Government will exist in
greater purity, without.. .the aid of Government.”2 Madison clearly believed that
prohibiting an establishment of religion meant the complete separation of

government and religion, not so much for the protection of the government and
freedom, but for the purity and sake of religion.
In addition to the personal beliefs of some of the founding fathers, the

constitutions and legislative activity of the states provide some insight into the
meaning of establishment of religion.” While the colonial period saw many of

the future states supporting religion or a particular sect with government money,
only six states still allowed government support of religion at the time of the

framing of the Bill of Rights. All six of these states did so by supporting more
than one denomination in their state3, so in the very least, a prohibition against an
establishment of religion meant that the Congress could not favor one religious
sect over another. Other states had already taken steps to fix a permanent

separation between church and state. Furthermore, laws regarding establishments

Levy. Quoting James Madison. p. 85.
Ibid. Quoting James Madison. p. 86.
3 Ibid. p. 92.
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of religion in the states by 1789 dealt almost exclusively with funding of churches

with public tax money. The concept of freedom to choose how and where to
worship was already well established. The framers intended, in the very least, to

prohibit the preferential funding of a religious sect when they drafted the

Establishment Clause. After its ratification in 1791, the Establishment Clause of

the First Amendment, like half of the states at the time, effectively prevented the
expenditure of government funds for the benefit of any religious group.1

The Establishment Clause was an effort by its framers to protect religion
from the state and the state from religion. The Establishment Clause also was
meant to protect both believers and nonbelievers from each other, while at the

same time uniting them together under the banner of a free society. Undoubtedly,

the Establishment Clause was written with an emphasis on a prohibition of direct
government subsidies to churches, but further prohibitions and protections are not

as clear. Issues such as prayer in school and tax exempt status of churches were
taken for granted until the twentieth century in the United States, and dealing with

these modem matters of church and state requires the Supreme Court and other

lower courts to establish some measure of acceptable and uniform interpretation

beyond the intent of the framers and the literal wording of the text of the
Establishment Clause. The interpretive tests that emulate from the Court create an
unmistakable evolution of the meaning and application of the Establishment

Clause. This study will now turn to an evaluation of arguably the most important
1 Levy. p. 102.
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series of cases in the interpreation of the Establishment Clause, beginning with
Everson and leading up to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
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Chapter II: The Evolution of Establishment Clause Interpretation

Most scholars agree that following four cases are the most significant in the
steady evolution of Establishment Clause. Everson v. Board ofEducation of the
Township of Ewing (1947), addressing a reimbursement program for school
transportation, was the first case to come before the Supreme Court dealing

specifically with the constitutionality of a government program that affected a
religious institution. The Everson decision offered the rudimentary test. Walz v.

Tax Commission of the City ofNew York (1970), involving the tax-exempt status
of churches, followed. The Walz ruling created a new interest: the degree of

church-state entanglement. The third case, Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), addressed
a teacher salary supplement that benefited instructors at sectarian schools. The
majority opinion in Lemon combined the tests fashioned in Everson and Walz to

create the famous “Lemon Test.” The final case in this progression is Lynch v.

Donnelly (1984), which tested the Constitutionality of a city’s public Christmas
display. Lynch is unique among these cases because its major contribution to this

evolution comes not in the majority opinion but in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
concurring opinion. She first proposed the “Endorsement Test” which would
become the test of choice for the Court’s majority thirteen years later in Agostini v.

Felton. Each of these precedents advanced the development of Establishment
Clause interpretation and stand as a vital prelude to the Zelman case.
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Everson v. Board ofEducation of the Township ofEwing (1947)

The first case in this evolution was Everson v. Board ofEducation of the
Township of Ewing in 1947. At issue was a New Jersey law that allowed for

public reimbursement for the cost of bus fare to and from school to parents of
children attending both public and area Catholic schools. A taxpayer in the district

in question challenged the constitutionality of this law, claiming that it violated the

Establishment Clause by supporting, with public money, the religious endeavors
of the Catholic schools.1 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the divided court,
asserted that the Establishment Clause was not violated by this New Jersey law
because it had a distinct secular purpose of providing for the safe transportation of
students to school, whether the school was public or Catholic. The law did not

directly fund the Catholic schools and was no different than laws that provide for
police and fire protection to both Catholic and public schools. The law simply

created a program to help parents of children in Catholic schools with getting their

children to school safely, as if they were enrolled in public schools.

Justice Black was careful to outline the stringent nature of the
Establishment Clause and was quick to admit that “the First Amendment has

1 Syllabus for Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). On-line
database. Legal Information Institute, 2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://www2.law.comell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic...
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erected a wall between church and state.”1 His argument here, though, was that
the New Jersey law had a distinct secular purpose and did not advance religion,
thus establishing the first test for Establishment Clause interpretation and laying

the foundation for the first two components of the Lemon Test. The statute did not

directly benefit any Catholic schools and only allowed the most basic public
service, that of safety, to students attending Catholic schools. While Justice Black

admitted that some parents may not have sent their children to the Catholic
schools in the district without the reimbursement or the guarantee of safety for
their children, he quickly asserted that this alone does not make for a state
sponsorship of religion, only an effort to assist parents in getting their children to

school safely. The independent choice of the parents to send their children to
Catholic schools should not deny them the state subsidy to insure their children’s

safe travel.12 The secular nature of the law, as well as its incidental effects,

convinced Justice Black it did not breach the impregnable wall between church
and state and was therefore constitutional.3

The most notable problem with the ruling in Everson is the apparent

discrepancy between the strict separation of church and state, noted in the opinion,
and the possibility of accommodation, which formed the basis of the ruling.

Justice Black, in effect, created the need for evolving interpretive tests with this

1 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). On-line database.
FindLaw, 2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://caselaw.lp.fmdlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=330&page=l . p. 7.
2 Ibid. p. 6.
3 Ibid. p. 7.
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discrepancy because he recognizes a “wall between church and state,” but allows

for breaches of this supposedly impregnable barrier due to special circumstances.
These exceptions would require the attention of the Court in future cases to define

and limit acceptable accommodation. Everson also suffers because the state

program in question only benefited children attending Catholic schools but did not
apply to students of other private schools. Ironically, Justice Black’s ruling favors

Catholic schools over other religious and “for profit” private schools while his

opinion denounces government sponsorship of the advancement of religion. The
discrepancies of Everson would generate more questions and tensions in
Establishment Clause interpretation. Future cases would be needed to help clarify
the divergence between separation and accommodation.

The results of Everson were both immediate and far-reaching. For the first

time in American history, the Court defined the Establishment Clause. It fueled
the debate between those with a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause

and those with a very literal, and therefore limited, view of the clause. New state
legislation passed regarding government aid for religion and called for increased

participation and funding by the government in religious matters and
organizations.1 The stage was being set for a protracted battle over the

Establishment Clause. The next important step in the progression of interpretation

1 Morgan, Richard E. The Supreme Court and Religion. The Supreme Court in American Life Series.
New York: The Free Press, 1972. p. 93.
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would come in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City ofNew York, twenty-three
years after the Courts’ Everson decision.

Between Everson and Walz, the only Establishment Clause case to come

before the Court was Board ofEducation v. Allen in 1968. At issue here was a
book loan program available to all students in both public and private schools in
New York. The appellants in Allen asserted that this program violated the

Establishment Clause by using public money to support religious schools. The

ruling in Allen relied heavily on Everson and held that the New York program had
a distinct secular purpose of providing books to all students and did nothing to

advance religion. The Allen ruling simply reaffirmed the interpretational
standards of Everson and did not contribute to the evolution of constitutional
doctrine.1 The nation would have to wait for Walz v. Tax Commission of the City

ofNew York to come before the Court in 1970 for the next major step in the
clarification of the Establishment Clause.2

Walz v. Tax Commission of the City ofNew York (1970)

The next major contribution to the Establishment Clause tests came in Walz

v. Tax Commission of the City ofNew York in 1970. The issue was whether a New
York law that gave church property a tax-exempt status was constitutional.
1 Allen v. Board of Education, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). On-line database. FindLaw, 2002. Accessed 5 May
2003. Available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=392&invol=236. p. 5.
Pfeffer, Leo. Religious Freedom, To Protect These Rights Series. Skokie, Ill: National Textbook
Company, 1977. p. 29.
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Frederick Walz, a property owner in Richmond County, New York sued the New

York City Tax Commission for granting property tax exemptions to churches.
Walz claimed that the exemptions represented in fact an indirect contribution to

churches by way of allowing them to operate without the burden of taxation,
which, in turn, caused Walz to theoretically pay more in taxes to cover the cost of

the religious exemption.1 In a solid 7-1 majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger
announced that the exemptions were constitutional. The majority argued that

because no particular church or group received preference over another, the
exemptions did not advance or inhibit religion. The decision also noted that the
entanglement of church and state is less with the tax exemptions than it would be

if the churches were taxed. The majority asserted that “benevolent neutrality”
toward churches was not a violation of the Establishment Clause and was inherent
in the ideas of the American public.12
Chief Justice Burger argued in his majority opinion that the Establishment

Clause might not be so much a rigid statute but rather a general principle that

government cannot establish or interfere with religion. If these conditions are met,
there may be some flexibility in the “benevolent neutrality which will permit

1 Syllabus for Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). On-line database
Legal Information Institute, 2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://www2.law.comell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic...
2 “Summary of Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York.” The Oyez Project. On-line database.

Northwestern University, 2002. Accessed 3 November 2002. Available at
http://oyez.org/cases/cases.cgi?command=show&case_id=430.
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religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”1 Chief

Justice Burger asserted that this benevolent neutrality should extend to churches

indiscriminately as it does to any non-profit corporation, such as libraries and
hospitals, because these organizations are beneficial to the community and should

be preserved as tax-exempt.12 More importantly, churches should be protected
from the potential powers of taxation because therein lies the power to destroy.

For government to fulfill its directive to neither advance nor inhibit religion, it

must not engage in the taxation of church property in order to avoid inhibiting
religion.3

Most important in this case to the development of Establishment Clause
tests was Chief Justice Burger’s examination of the possible excessive

entanglement of government with religion. To satisfy the Establishment Clause

and to pass constitutional muster, he claimed the tax exempt status of churches
must not result in excessive entanglements of church and state. Burger argued that

while tax exemption does cause a small degree of involvement between
government and religion, it is comparatively smaller than the ensuing

entanglement that would result from the taxation of church property. Church

property taxation would result in increased accounting, supervision, and
punishment by government on churches and would therefore violate the newly

1 Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). On-line database. FindLaw,
2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://caselaw.lp.fmdlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=397&invol=664 . p. 3.
2 Ibid. p. 4.
3 Ibid. p. 5.
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developed third component, or prong, of the forthcoming Lemon Test.1 Tax

exemption does not result in churches receiving state revenue, but it does prevent

government from receiving funds from churches. This fact, along with the
minimal entanglement that results from church tax exemption, allowed the
property tax exempt status of churches to remain constitutionally sound.

2

The most obvious short and long term effect of Walz, besides its

contribution to the Lemon Test, is the tax-exempt status of churches and non
profit groups. While churches today still enjoy this exemption, many critics have

spoken out against this position, one of them being Justice William Douglas in his
dissent in Walz. He and other critics believe that there is no distinct practical
difference between tax exemption and a government subsidy. If this is true, then

Douglas was justified in his concern over the tax exempt status of churches
because “one of the best ways to ‘establish’ one or more religions is to subsidize
them.”3

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

The next step in the evolution in Establishment Clause interpretive tests

was the now-celebrated “Lemon Test” that arose in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971.

The Court actually combined two pending cases, one concerning a Pennsylvania
1 Walz. Find Law. p. 5.
2 Ibid. p. 6.
3 Corbett, Michael and Julia Mitchell Corbett. Politics and Religion in the United States. New York and
London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999. p. 173.
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program (Lemon v. Kurtzman) and the other concerning a Rhode Island program

(Earley v. DiCenso), and announced the ruling under the name of the Pennsylvania

suit. The Rhode Island 1969 Salary Supplement Act gave a 15% salary
supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools, including sectarian schools. To be
eligible, teachers only had to teach non-religious subjects using non-religious

materials, as if they were in a public school. The Pennsylvania Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act likewise directly funded teacher salary
in non-public, often sectarian, schools, as well as provided funding directly to the

schools for teaching materials. The same criteria were required of the

Pennsylvania program that had been set forth in the Rhode Island program: the
benefits could only be put towards subjects that were completely secular.1 Chief
Justice Burger wrote for the majority as he had in Walz, but this time his opinion
overturned the programs that benefited religion. To show that these programs

were unconstitutional, he combined the two requirements of “having a secular
legislative purpose” and of “neither inhibiting nor advancing religion as a primary
effect” from Everson with the “no excessive government entanglement with
religion” requirement from Walz.1
2 Using this derivative standard, Burger found

that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs passed the first and the second

1 Syllabus for Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). On-line
database. Legal Information Institute,
2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic...
2 “Summary of Lemon v. Kurtzman.” The Oyez Project. On-line
database. Northwestern University,
2002. Accessed 3 November 2002. Available at
http://oyez.org/cases/cases.cgi?command=show&case_id=207.
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components, but both failed to avoid an excessive government entanglement with

religion due to the required state of private religious schools.1
Chief Justice Burger outlined the first two prongs of the “Lemon Test” by
recalling the decision of the majority in Everson. Next, he systematically tested

both the Rhode Island program and the Pennsylvania program against the two
Everson prongs. He found that both programs passed the “secular legislative

purpose” test, saying “the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to

enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant

anything else.”1
2 Burger then stated that both programs appeared to pass the

“neither advances nor inhibits religion as a primary effect” test by noting that the

legislators had taken great care to input safeguards and precautions to ensure the
passage of this test; however, in doing so, the legislators violated the newly
established “no excessive government entanglement in religion” prong of the

“Lemon Test” because of the nature of the safeguards.3 Chief Justice Burger
asserted that the extensive entanglements, required by the programs, that result
from the auditing, accounting, and monitoring of the schools by the government

constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause. These entanglements also
included those of a political nature due to the vast popularity of the programs. The

1 Ibid.
2 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). On-line database. FindLaw, 2002. Accessed 1 November
2002. Available at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=403&invol=602. p. 7.
3 Lemon. Find Law. p. 7.
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impact of these programs might shift the political dialogue so much in favor of
them, that the democratic process in the communities where the programs exist

might be quashed.

Finally, Burger ceased his commentary on the constitutional

dysfunctions of the two education programs and noted the benefits of religious

schools for the nation. These benefits, though, must be overlooked if their pursuit
and advancement come into conflict with the Constitution. Burger declared that

government support of religious schools in this case must stop, saying “The
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
amily, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and

entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.”12
Chief Justice Burger's thorough and methodical approach in Lemon was

important because it helped establish the legitimacy of the “Lemon Test” as the

premier Establishment Clause interpretative standard. He showed that both
programs in question passed the first two prongs of the “Lemon Test”, and then he

explained why they both failed the third portion of the test. This systematic

method instituted a strong test that required public policy to pass all portions of the
“Lemon Test”. While “two out of three ain’t bad” might apply to romance or

make for good song lyrics3, it has no place in the salvation of government
programs affecting religious education.

1 Ibid. p. 11.
2 Ibid. p. 12.
3 Meatloaf. “Two out of Three ain’t Bad.” Bat out ofHell. Epic Records, 1978.
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Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)

After Lemon v. Kurtzman, the “Lemon Test” was unquestioned as the
authoritative Establishment Clause case test for thirteen years. The next case in
this study of interpretive evolution is unlike the others in this study because the
important contribution of the case to the evolutionary process comes not in the

majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger but in the concurring
opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice
O Connor proposes a variation and recombination of the “Lemon Test” that would
later replace it as the primary vehicle for Establishment Clause interpretation.

While the majority did not yet adopt her ideas as their own, her “Endorsement
would eventually become the test used by the majority more than ten years

later in Agostini v. Felton.1

The issue in Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 was the annual Christmas display in
the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island. The display was erected each Christmas

season in a park, owned by a nonprofit organization, located in the center of the
city’s commercial sector. The forty-year-old tradition included a Santa Clause

house, a Christmas tree, a Seasons Greetings” banner, and a Nativity scene.2

David Donnelly took offense at the display of the Nativity scene, or creche, and
filed suit against Pawtucket’s mayor, Dennis Lynch. Donnelly claimed that the
1 Longley, p. 2.

Syllabus for Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668
2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
Legal Information Institute,
http://www2.law.comell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic...
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creche in a public place was a violation of the “Lemon Test” and thus a violation

of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the 5-4 majority, held that the creche did not violate the

Establishment Clause because the scene, when viewed in the context of the season,
had a legitimate secular purpose and did not pose an intentional effort to advance
one religion over another? The majority opinion states that the “wall of

separation” between church and state is not absolute.2 Some accommodation is
acceptable between the two, especially during the Christmas holiday season when

such a display has historical significance. The display’s secular purpose is

achieved by spreading good cheer among citizens during the holiday, while not

making a serious attempt to favor one religion over another?
While Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion may have been
groundbreaking in its own right, the important contribution of this case to the

interpretive evolution of the Establishment Clause came from Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion. The entire purpose of O’Connor’s separate opinion was to

remodel the “Lemon Test” into a new and simpler standard that would, in

O'Connor's opinion, be a more manageable and accurate constitutional test. She
condensed the three prongs of the “Lemon Test” into just two. The first prong in

O'Connor's Endorsement Test is the government’s prohibition of “excessive

Summary of Lynch v. Donnelly." The Oyez Project. On-line database. Northwestern University, 2002.
http:^/'vww.oyez.com/cases/cases.cgi?case_id=217&command=show
Syllabus for Lynch v. Donnelly.
3 “Summary of Lynch v. Donnelly.”
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entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the

independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to government or

governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster
the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines.”1 O’Connor

then combined the “secular legislative purpose” and the “neither advances nor
inhibits religion as a primary effect” prongs of the “Lemon Test” to create the

endorsement component for which her test is named. This prong checks for the
more direct infringement on the Establishment Clause because “endorsement

sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are

insiders, favored members of the political community.”2 O’Connor asserts that
her new version of the “Lemon Test” better serves the intentions of the
Establishment Clause and that “focusing on institutional entanglement and on

endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the “Lemon Test” as an analytical
device.”3

In the context of Lynch v. Donnelly, O’Connor stated that the key issue in

the case was whether the city of Pawtucket had endorsed Christianity specifically
through its Nativity display. Applying her newly formed standard, O’Connor

concludes that endorsement is determined by two equally important factors: the

2«>"C AvaaZea!y’

U'S'668 (1984’- °-ta

Ftadlaw, 2002. Accessed 1 November

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=465&invol=668 p. 12
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). p 12
668. p. 12.
3 Ibid. p. 13.
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objective purpose of the city’s display and the subjective effect or message

produced by the crèche. O'Connor deduced that the secular purpose of the display

Was to not endorse Christianity over other religions but to celebrate the holiday
season through its traditional images, which has legitimate secular and cultural

importance.

Justice O'Connor then concluded that the effect of the display does

not advance one religion over another because the general public would not

interpret the creche as a specific endorsement of Christianity but a celebration of
the public and secular holiday season.2

While Justice O’Connor’s new interpretive test did not immediately win
support, it would eventually do so when she wrote the majority opinion in Agostini
V. Felton in 1997. Before Agostini situated O’Connor’s “Endorsement Test” as the

basis of the majority opinion, she remained in the concurrence or even the

minority, particularly in the later overturned Aguilar v. Felton in 1985. The usage
Of the “Endorsement Test” in the Agostini majority opinion allowed the Court to

overturn Aguilar and preserve a New York statue that sent public school teachers

and councilors into private, often sectarian, schools. O’Connor found that New
rk's Title I program, the focus of Agostini, “does not result in governmental

indoctrination, define its recipients by reference to religion, or create an excessive

entanglement. Nor can this carefully constrained program reasonably be viewed as

1Ibid.
2 Ibid. p. 15.
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an endorsement of religion.”1 Because the New York program satisfied all the
requirements of O’Connor’s newly accepted interpretive standard, the program
was upheld as squaring with the Establishment Clause and was therefore

constitutional.12

1 Syllabus for Agostini v. Felton, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). On-line database. Legal Information Institute,
2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://www2.law.comell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic...
2 Ibid.
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Chapter III: ZeIman v. Simmons-Harris and the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

The final case in this study of the evolution of Establishment clause

interpretive standards is the 2002 school voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.

Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman is examined, the preceding
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit will be
analyzed to frame the facts and legal arguments of the case, most of which are

mirrored in the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled on December 11,2000, that the

Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris was
unconstitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, this decision was overturned

by a five-to-four majority opinion. An examination of the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is employed here because the facts

and arguments used in this ruling form the basis for those used in the Supreme

Court’s opposite ruling. Also, using the opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this study diversifies the sources, ideological

beliefs, and political opinions needed for a complete study of the evolution of the
Establishment clause. The following examination will summarize the complete
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decision, including both the majority and dissenting opinions, of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.1

The Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program came as a result of an order by

the United States District Court that entrusted the failing Cleveland School District
to the administration of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. In an effort

to reform the educational system of the Cleveland School District, the Ohio
General Assembly passed Ohio Rev. Code §3323, which established the Ohio
Pilot Project Scholarship Program.2

This voucher program gives financial assistance grants to help enable
families with children in the failing Cleveland School District, in grades

Kindergarten through the eighth grade, send their children to a private school

within the district, to a public school outside the district, or to help them secure
and finance special tutoring help while remaining in the Cleveland public school
system.

Private Schools registered in the program, 82% of which are religious in

nature, must cap their tuition for voucher-using students at $2,500. A second
requirement of the private schools in the program is that they must not

discriminate against any student on the basis of religion or race, must not teach

1 Cases on appeal to the United States Supreme Court from circuit appeals courts have a reversed docket
name. This case before the Sixth Circuit was docketed as Simmons-Harris v. Zelman. Because the Sixth
Circuit ruled that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program was unconstitutional, and thus in favor of
Simmons-Harris, the case on appeal before the Supreme Court was brought by Zelman and was docketed as
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. For the purposes of this paper, this case will continue to be referred to as
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris to avoid confusion, except in instances of documentation.
2 Clay, Eric, Circuit Judge. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 2000 FED App. 041 1P (2000). United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Published Opinions. Available at
http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=OOa041 lp.06. p. 1.
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hatred of any person or group, and must meet the State’s educational standards.
While the program allows parents to send their children to a public school outside
of the Cleveland District, no school outside the district has entered the program, so

this option does not currently exist for parents in Cleveland. Preference for

vouchers is given to low-income families with earnings below 200% of the

poverty line. More than 60% of the families currently participating in the program

are classified as low-income households and qualify for a voucher of up to 90% of
the tuition of their chosen private school. Non-low-income families can qualify

for up to 75% of tuition for schools in the program if all low-income families that

wish to participate have been placed.1
After a family that qualifies for the program selects a private school, a

check for the tuition grant is made out in the parent’s name and is sent to the
chosen school. This check is then signed over to the school by the parent in order

to fund their child’s tuition. The voucher funds may be used with no limitations
by the school in any manner it sees fit. As previously stated, 82% (forty-six out of

fifty-six) of the private schools participating in the program are of a religious
nature. Equally important to the case at hand, 96% of the students enrolled in the

program attend one of the forty-six enrolled sectarian schools. These last two

facts create the constitutional debate of whether this voucher program violates the

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. p. 1.
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Establishment Clause of the Constitution by its granting of government funding to

private, and usually religious, schools.1

The Majority Ruling

In the two to one majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris written by

Judge Eric Clay, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Federal District
Court’s ruling that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program violates the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional.
Drawing on a number of Supreme Court precedents, the majority held that the

voucher program “constitutes an impermissible infringement under the

Establishment Clause”2 by unconstitutionally funding and favoring the religious
endeavors of the private, sectarian schools in the Cleveland, Ohio area. The

majority applied the “Lemon Test” as well as a number of precedent-setting

Supreme Court decisions, particularly Committee ofPublic Education v. Nyquist,

to reach its own opinion in this case.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court established the “Lemon Test” to

determine whether statutes square with the Establishment Clause. The “Lemon
Test” contains three parts: the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, the

primary effect of the statute must not advance or inhibit religion, and the statute

1Clay. Sixth Circuit. p.1-2.
2 Ibid. p.14.
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must not create excessive entanglements for the government with religion. The
Sixth Circuit used primarily the second portion of the “Lemon Test” to determine

whether the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program is constitutional. The Court

also considered the issue of government entanglement with religion, but drawing

on Agostini v. Felton, the matter of government entanglement is included as apart
of the second portion (the primary effect of the statute must not advance or inhibit
religion) in the “Endorsement Test”, a variation of the “Lemon Test”, and not as a

separate, third section. The Court majority asserted that the voucher program

violates this second element of these interpretive standards and then proceeded to
defend this opinion by drawing on a number of Establishment Clause cases

decided by the United States Supreme Court.1
The primary case that the majority used to support its decision is Committee

ofPublic Education v. Nyquist. The majority asserted that“...Nyquist governs our

result. Factually, the program at hand is a tuition grant program for low-income
parents whose children attend private school parallel to the tuition reimbursement

program found impermissible in Nyquist”2. At issue in Nyquist was a tuition
reimbursement program established in New York State that helped low-income
families pay for private schools for their children. The State would reimburse

50% of the cost of tuition to allow these low-income families the opportunity for a

better education for their children and to help alleviate the overcrowded

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. p.6.
2 Ibid. p.10.
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population of the New York State public school system. 85% of the private
schools that participated in this program were religious, sectarian institutions.

While this program passed the first portion of the “Lemon Test” because it had a
primary secular purpose, it did not do as well with the second part of the test. The
Supreme Court ruled that the New York program had no way of guaranteeing that

its funding would be used for neutral, secular purposes because the vast majority
of the schools in the program were religious. Also, since no additional options for
funding were given to the parents of children that remained in public schools, the

reimbursement program only favored, and encouraged, those that sent their

children to the private, and most likely sectarian, schools. The Supreme Court

then concluded that the New York reimbursement program violated the
Establishment Clause because it had a primary effect of advancing religion, in this

case religious schools. Because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals saw little to no
difference between the New York program from Nyquist and the Ohio Pilot
Project Scholarship Program in Zelman, the Court decided to judge Zelman on the

Supreme Court’s precedent in Nyquist and ruled the Ohio voucher program
unconstitutional.1

The Sixth Circuit majority next addressed a number of more recent cases,
with regard to “paroch-aid,” that uphold the constitutionality of some instances of
government support and funding of religious institutions. Everson v. Board of

Education and Board of Education v. Allen were mentioned because they are

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. p.6.
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instances of government funding that benefited sectarian schools that passed
constitutional muster. The Sixth Circuit asserted that these cases do not apply to

either Nyquist or Zelman because the programs from these cases work to advance
religion and did not include all school children as beneficiaries, whereas the
programs in Everson and Allen did benefit all students equally and with a neutral

stance towards religion'.
Next, the majority in Zelman expounded on this notion of “defraying the
cost of tuition for all parents, regardless of the type of school their children

attend”.12 The majority cited Mueller v. Allen and Agostini v. Felton as cases
where the Supreme Court upheld programs that mutually and equally benefited all

school children and their parents. Mueller addressed a Minnesota program that
gave a tax break to parents for their children’s educational expenses. The

Supreme Court upheld this because the program gave the tax incentives to all
parents of school children in Minnesota for whatever educational expenses that
their children might require, including private school tuition. In Agostini, the
Supreme Court upheld the New York program that sent public school teachers into

private schools in order to assist with remedial, secular subjects. Once again, the
Court ruled that since the government’s actions did not serve to advance religion

and since the service was available to all students regardless of their choice of
school, the program was constitutional. The majority in Zelman dismissed these

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit, p.6
2 Ibid. p.7
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cases from applying to the Ohio voucher program because they asserted that Ohio
is advancing religion through its voucher program.

The Sixth Circuit majority also addressed the issue of independent and
private choice by looking at Witters v. Washington Department ofServices for the

Blind. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington State program that

gave educational funding to blind individuals. Witters used his grant in order to
pay for his tuition to a religious seminary college in order to become a preacher.

The Supreme Court ruled that this program was constitutional because Witters
made a “genuinely independent and private choice” to attend the seminary and

was not in any way encouraged to do so by the government. “The Court also
found that the mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally
available state aid to help pay for his religious education does not confer any

message of state endorsement of religion”? While recognizing this important
case, the Sixth Circuit majority declared that Witters did not grant constitutionality

to Zelman because the Ohio voucher program did not provide a neutral choice of
where to spend its educational funds as the vast majority of schools in the program

were religious. The majority asserted that whereas Witter had a completely
independent choice as to where to use his grant, the participants in the Ohio

voucher program did not, making the program unconstitutional.1
2

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. p.8
2 Ibid.
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To conclude the majority opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Zelman, the Court held that the Ohio voucher program was unconstitutional

because it funds and favors religious, sectarian schools. The majority used
primarily Nyquist to support its decision. The court, however, recognized

exceptions to the Nyquist rules as found in other, more recent cases. Justice

Thomas summarized the issues of law in these cases when he said in Mitchell v.
Helms, “the critical question in cases of government aid to religious schools is
whether the government aid is neutral: whether it results from the genuinely

independent and private choices of individual parents”1. If these conditions are

met, then exceptions to the ruling in Nyquist can be claimed. The majority ruled

that the Ohio voucher program did not qualify for these exceptions. Because the
program caps the tuition of included private schools at $2,500, Ohio was favoring

religious schools that did not require the same per-student-income as did non
religious private schools. Private religious schools enjoy a number of additional

financial sources, including private donations and church backing, to which non
sectarian private schools do not usually have access. “The evidence illustrates this
point in that 82% of participating schools are sectarian, just as in Nyquist where
85% of the participating schools were sectarian” . Also, public schools outside of

the Cleveland School District were discouraged from participating in the voucher
program, despite that option, because of the maximum of $2,250 available per

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. Quoting Justice Thomas, p. 8.
2 Ibid.
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student. This amount would not come close to paying for the cost of educating an

additional student, resulting in a complete lack of participation by other public

schools. In the end, the majority found that “there is no neutral aid when that aid

principally flows to religious institutions; nor is there truly ‘private choice’ when

the available choices resulting from the program design are predominantly
religious”1, and thus the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program was declared

unconstitutional by way of violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent by Judge James Ryan of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
took the opposite stance with regard to the application of precedent to the Zelman
case and accordingly votes in favor of the constitutionality of the Ohio voucher

program. His position would become largely the same as the majority of Supreme
Court justices when Zelman v. Simmons-Harris came before the Supreme Court.
While Judge Ryan agreed with the cases that the majority used, he sharply, and

sometimes harshly, disagreed with the relevance of the Nyquist case and with the
irrelevance of the other, more recent “Paroch-aid” cases. These differences of

opinion between the majority and the minority hinge on the issue of whether the

1 Clay. Sixth Circuit. p. 12.
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Ohio program offers a neutral and private choice to its participants as to where

they can spend their education grants.1

Judge Ryan pointed out three major differences between Zelman and

Nyquist that eliminate the controlling power of Nyquist with regard to the
constitutionality of the Ohio voucher program. The first was that the Ohio

program was providing an opportunity for parents to choose to place their children

in private schools, non-religious or sectarian, in order to escape the failing

Cleveland school system. The program in Nyquist on the other hand was intended
to provide financial support to the financially troubled private schools in New

York in order to keep them from closing. Secondly, the Ohio program did not
grant money to any private school except by the careful selection thereof after
reviewing a number of options. Only then did a school receive government
funding. In the New York program, though, direct financial grants were allotted to

the private, and usually religious, schools in order to offset their operational costs.
Thirdly, the Ohio program explicitly prohibited any school from engaging in

discrimination against students or teachers on the basis of religion. The New York

program in Nyquist had no such provision. Because of these differences, Judge

Ryan concluded that “a case construing a statute so manifestly different than the

1 Ryan, James, Senior Circuit Judge. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 2000 FED App. 041 IP (2000). United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Published Opinions. Available at
http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl7OPINION-00a041 Ip.06. p. 15.
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one before us could hardly, as a factual matter, be a binding precedent on this

court”.1
Next, Judge Ryan argued that since Nyquist should not be used in deciding
Zelman, then the more recent Establishment Clause cases should be used to

supplement the “Lemon Test”. Ryan employed many of the same cases that the
majority cites for the opposite purpose: to prove the constitutionality of the Ohio

voucher program. Ryan asserted that the Ohio program did, in fact, offer its
participants the neutral and overwhelmingly “genuinely independent and private

choice” that the majority saw oppositely. Ryan listed five options to participants
in the Ohio program: 1. To permit their children to remain in Cleveland public

schools as before; 2. To accept a tuition voucher for them to attend a Cleveland
area nonreligious private school; 3. To accept a tuition voucher for them to attend
a Cleveland area religious private school; 4. To accept a voucher for them to

obtain special tutorial help in the Cleveland schools; 5. To accept a voucher for
them to attend a public school in a district adjacent to Cleveland, although for the

present these districts have declined to participate in the program.12 These options

more than satisfied the requirement for a genuinely independent and private choice
that were required by Witters, Agostini, and other precedent-setting cases.
Judge Ryan then evaluated the “Lemon Test” as restructured in Agostini

and the resulting “Endorsement Test”. The second portion of the test, or the

1 Ryan. Sixth Circuit, p. 17.
2 Ibid. p. 20.
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“impermissible effect” prong that requires that statutes neither advance nor inhibit

religion as their primary effect, was satisfied by the Ohio voucher program
because the aid did not result in governmental indoctrination, define its recipients

by reference to religion, nor create an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.1 Because the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program

passed the “Lemon Test” and the “Endorsement Test” in his assessment, Judge
Ryan dissented and voted in favor of its constitutionality.

Ryan’s dissent went on to explain the majority’s belief that the Ohio
program favored religious schools. He attributed the lower cost of tuition of some

religious schools not to private funding but to their desire to offer to all students a
chance for a better education. He then concluded that the cap set on tuition by the
program was in place not to favor religious schools but to reasonably limit the cost

of the voucher program to the state. He then recognized that fact that no

nonreligious participating private school had ever turned away a voucher
participant and that the parents were choosing to send their children to

predominantly sectarian schools when they could pick the nonreligious private

schools. Surprisingly, Ryan then accused the majority of both disliking the extent
of the religiousness of the sectarian schools and believing that participating

parents in the Ohio program did not realize that they were sending their children to
sectarian schools.1
2 In conclusion, Judge Ryan believed that the Ohio Pilot Project

1 Ryan. Sixth Circuit. p. 18
2 Ibid. p. 20.
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Scholarship Program passed the constitutional muster by offering a neutral and
private choice to its participants and therefore squared with the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
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Chapter IV: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris before the Supreme Court

The final step in this examination of the evolution of Establishment Clause

tests is Zelman v. Simmons-Harris before the Supreme Court. Zelman relies on
O’Connor’s “Endorsement Test” variation of the “Lemon Test” to assess the

constitutionality of the Ohio school voucher program. This case is also important
for the sub-tests that it provides to further clarify the meaning of the Establishment

Clause. As it turns out, the majority ruling closely mirrors the technique and
substance of Judge Ryan’s dissenting opinion from the Sixth Circuit. Justice

David Souter’s dissenting opinion, however, is much more original and will be
analyzed here to a greater extent than the majority opinion by Chief Justice

William Rehnquist.

The Majority Ruling

Recall the basic elements in Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program.

Simply put, the voucher program gives a number of educational choices to

families in the failing Cleveland public school district. The program’s options
include tuition funds for students to attend participating public or private schools

in the adjacent area that meet state standards and for private tutoring for those
students that choose to remain in their current school. Priority in the program is
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given to families that are 200% or more below the poverty line.1 Of the students

in the program that chose to use the tuition assistance to attend private schools,
96% chose to use their vouchers at religious schools. Also, 82% of the private

schools participating in the program are sectarian, religious schools.12 Because of
these statistics, a group of Ohio taxpayers filed suit against the voucher program,

claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
Constitution. Chief Justice William Rehnquist gave the opinion of the 5-4

majority, holding that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause. The

majority ruled that the program is clearly an attempt to improve the failing
Cleveland school district, and by nature of the number of choices afforded, is not
an endorsement of religion nor an excessive entanglement between church and

state.3
Zelman is an important case in the evolution of Establishment Clause tests

because of the numerous sub-tests that Rehnquist presents in his majority opinion.

The first new component of the “Endorsement Test” is the notion of private
individual choice. Because the program offers such a variety of choices, it cannot

have a purpose or an effect of endorsing religion. Families in the program have
six options afforded to them: 1. staying in their current school and use their

voucher for private tutoring; 2. enrolling in a public school in an adjoining school
1 Syllabus for Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 000 U.S. 00-1751 (2002). On-line database. Legal Information
Institute, 2002. Accessed 1 November 2002. Available at
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/historic ...
2 Ibid.
3 “Summary of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.” The Oyez Project. On-line database. Northwestern
University, 2002. Accessed 3 November 2002. Available at
http://oyez.org/cases/cases.cgi?command=show&case_id=1496&page=abstract
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2 Ibid.
3 “Summary ofZelmanv. Simmons-Harris.” The Oyez Project. On-line database. Northwestern
University, 2002. Accessed 3 November 2002. Available at
http://oyez.org/cases/cases.cgi? command=show&case_id=1496&page=abstract
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district to Cleveland; 3. enrolling in a private, non-religious school; 4. enrolling in
a private, religious school; 5. enrolling in a community school; 6. and enrolling in
a specialized magnet school. The sheer number of options available gives parents
multiple opportunities and true private individual choice.1 The fact that the

majority of families in the program choose to enroll in private, religious schools,
does not imply a government endorsement, neither in effect nor purpose, of
2

religion, and thus the program survives the first prong of the “Endorsement Test”.

The program also lacks significant entanglement with religion because of the high
number of choices available to parents in the program. The government’s

responsibility in the program is to simply determine which families qualify for the
assistance and not to determine to which option the funds will be used.

3

The other new component, or clarification, to the “Endorsement Test”
found in Zelman is the notion of government neutrality. The Ohio voucher
program is neutral to religious preference because it is a “form of public assistance

made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian or publicnonpublic nature of the institution benefited.”1
234 The program provides funds to

people, determined only by financial need, and gives “aid directly to a broad class

of individual recipients defined without regard to religion.”5 Because of the
complete neutrality of the program with respect to religion and the true private
1 Zelman v. Simmons-Harns, 000 U.S. 00-1751 (2002). On-line database. FindLaw, 2002. Accessed 1
November 2002. Available at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&navby=title&vl=zelman. p. 9.
2 Ibid. p. 10.
3 Ibid. p. 6.
4 Ibid. p. 10.
5 Ibid.
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choice afforded to participants, the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program passes
all aspects of the “Lemon Test”, the “Endorsement Test”, and the Establishment
Clause, thereby allowing the program to stand as constitutional.1

The Passionate Dissent

The four dissenting justices in Zelman make a strong case in their
opposition to the ruling. The dissent of Justice David Souter, in which the three
other justices join, is particularly passionate and encompasses the most direct

arguments against the majority. Justice Souter begins his dissent by accusing the

majority of intentionally allowing a program to stand that “systematically provides
tax money to support the schools’ religious missions.”1
2 While Souter recognizes
the need for progressive reforms to aid failing schools, a direct violation of the

Establishment Clause and its interpretive history is not permissible. Souter quotes
Everson, “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any

religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form

they may adopt to teach or practice religion,” and he concludes that the Court has
overruled Everson with its decision in Zelman. Justice Souter’s conclusion is

based on his view that the Ohio voucher program has created a system were

1 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. p. 11.
2 Souter, David, Supreme Court Justice. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 000 U.S. GO1751 (2002). On-line database. FindLaw, 2002. Accessed 3 May 2003. Available at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&navby=title&vl=zelman. p. 35.
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thousands of students can transfer thousands of dollars each to private, religious
schools in a system that encourages students to attend these religious schools.1
Souter divides the history of Establishment Clause interpretive tests into

four periods. The first, lasting from 1947 to 1968, forbade all aid to sectarian
schools to prevent government support of religion. Then, from 1968 to 1983, the
Supreme Court held that aid to religious schools was permissible so long as that

aid would be divertible to be used only for secular, and not religious, purposes.

Next, from 1983 leading up to Zelman, the divertiblity of funds was eventually

ignored in favor of allowing indirect government aid in irregular occurrences and
unsubstantial amounts as the result of private free choice of the direct benefactor
of the aid. Souter claims that a fourth period has been created by the Zelman

majority, and this new stage is characterized by no consideration of substantial
benefit to religious schools and by employing neutrality and private choice

improperly as a defense for otherwise unconstitutional programs. This
unacceptable deviation from interpretive evolution towards an absence of

consideration on the substantial and regular aid of the Ohio program has resulted
in “doctrinal bankruptcy” on the part of the Court.12

Justice Souter attacks the majority’s assertion of government neutrality in
Zelman by arguing that the Ohio voucher program inherently endorses religious

schools. Souter claims the majority skewed the statistics to their advantage in

1 Souter. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman. p. 36.
2 Ibid. p. 35.
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ruling that the voucher program in question is evenhanded in its options.

Vouchers used by students to enroll in private schools, 96% of which were

religious, were worth up to $2,250 to the chosen schools, but vouchers used to hire

extra tutoring were only valued at $324. The majority argued that the option of

tutoring showed an effort by the government to remain neutral, but clearly more
aid was given to students who used their vouchers for private, sectarian, schooling.
Also, the majority claims that the options afforded to voucher participants,

including magnet and community schools, results in government neutrality as to
how the vouchers are to be used. Justice Souter counters that the voucher program
itself does not include magnet and community school options; therefore, the

majority’s argument for neutrality is invalid because the voucher program itself
has nothing to do with Ohio’s other alternate educational options. The dissenters

argue that the majority has willfully skewed the facts of Zelman to bolster their
assertion of government neutrality.1
Justice Souter’s dissent also attacks the majority’s argument of private,

individual choice in the Court’s ruling. Souter again confronts the use of magnet

and community schools. These programs do not involve private choice as the

majority claims because no money from the Ohio voucher program can go to these

schools. Justice Souter next raises the unlikelihood that religious, private school
enrollment will ever exceed that of public school attendance in Cleveland. He
concludes that the majority will always be able to argue that aid to religious
1 Souter. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman. p. 40.
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schools is far less than to public options, and thus aid to religion “is not the

significant intent or effect of the voucher scheme.”1 Justice Souter contends that
the “choice” argument is diluted by its application by the majority and that using

“choice” in this manner ruins its ability to serve as a component of an interpretive
test, with no ability to screen out violations.1
2

The statistics of the program clearly show that, while choice may exist in
theory, Ohio’s voucher program is skewed to influence participants to “choose”
religious schools. Two factors influence this conclusion by Justice Souter. The

first is the fact that Cleveland area nonreligious, private schools can only

accommodate 510 students (only 129 voucher students actually enrolled in

nonsectarian, private schools in 2001). With more than 3,500 students using
vouchers to attend private schools in 2001, there are not enough choices available
between sectarian and nonsectarian private schools. The second factor that

damages the majority’s claim of choice is the value of the vouchers. Each voucher

awarded is worth up to $2500 towards private school tuition. The average

nonreligious school tuition cost in the Cleveland area in 2001 was nearly $4000,
while the average sectarian school tuition was about $1600. The difference in
tuition costs is the result of the support that sectarian schools receive from their
parent religious organizations. This sponsorship allows religious school tuition to

fall under the Ohio voucher program cap, and thus the program intrinsically

1 Souter. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman. p. 41.
2 Ibid. p. 42.
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encourages its indigent participants to enroll in the religious schools. The

program’s only hope of not favoring religious schools would be to raise the

voucher cap significantly to pay full tuition costs to the more expensive

nonsectarian, private schools. Justice Souter argues, however, that this is not a
viable solution as an increase in voucher amounts will only inflate the substantive

government aid to religion, which will make the program violate the First
Amendment to an even greater extent.1
Justice Souter’s final grievance against the Ohio voucher program is the

influence it may have on religious schools and institutions. The constitutional

guarantee of free exercise of religion is compromised by the restrictions that the
voucher program places on participating schools. These schools cannot

discriminate against children of differing religions in their admissions process, and
they cannot teach hatred of any group on the basis of religion, which might
“prohibit religions from teaching traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the
error, sinfulness, or ignorance of others.”1
2 Souter worries that as “government aid

goes up, so does reliance on it; the only thing likely to go down is independence,”
which will inevitably result in government control over religious institutions.3
In conclusion, the dissenting justices through the opinion of Justice Souter

argue that the ruling in Zelman is incorrect because of two fundamental flaws in
the voucher program and the majority’s reasoning. First, the sheer amount of

1 Souter. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman. p. 44.
2 Ibid. p. 49.
3 Ibid. p. 50.
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money that will inevitably flow to religious schools as a result of the Ohio voucher

program could potentially be the primary income source for these sectarian

schools. This is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause because there is no
assurance that this substantial capital will be used for secular purpose but will

certainly be used to advance religious doctrine. Secondly, the majority’s argument

that the government is neutral and has offered numerous viable options in this
voucher program is certainly suspect as the majority has defined both of these in

ways that would not exclude any program that gives aid to religion. The options
offered unavoidably favor religious, private schools, resulting in a Hobson’s

choice1, and “a Hobson’s choice is not a choice, whatever the reason for being
Hobsonian.”*
2 Clearly, the dissenting justices believe that the majority ruling is

absolutely incorrect and “hope that a future Court will reconsider today’s dramatic

departure from basic Establishment Clause principle.”3

Webster's Dictionary defines 3 Hobson's choice as "an apparently free choice that offers no real
alternatives”. Available at http://www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?va=Hobson's .
2 Souter. Dissenting Opinion in Zelman. p. 53.
3 Ibid. p. 55
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Conclusion

Clearly, Establishment Clause interpretive standards have undergone a
significant evolution since their inception in the Everson case in 1947. Each

subsequent Supreme Court case, from Everson to Walz to Lemon to Lynch to
Zelman, added a unique perspective on the meaning of “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.”1 The “Lemon Test”, its variations
and its sub-tests, arose from this progression as a sure and stable trial for the

government to prove the constitutionality of its involvements, however minute or
indirect, with religion. This now famous test requires that actions by the

government that have some effect on religion serve a primary secular purpose,

neither advance nor inhibit religion, and not excessively entangle the government
with religion. This test was simplified by its “endorsement” variation by Justice
O'Connor which simply requires government interaction with religion to not cause

excessive entanglements or to not endorse one religion over another. The
Endorsement Test was then further explained by the sub-tests of government

neutrality to religion and of private individual choice with regard to possible

indirect state funding of a religious organization. These Establishment Clause
interpretive tests will continue to evolve in scope and to assist the government in

1 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1, sec. 1.
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determining the acceptability of relationships between church and state with
regard to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Zelman case did not deviate from the path of evolution of the

interpretation of the Establishment Clause started in the Everson case more than

fifty-five years ago, but it may have marked the beginning of a period of increased
tolerance of legislation that moves ever closer to violating the minimal

requirements of the Establishment Clause. The majority opinion relied on die
precedents and tests used in the past to determine the constitutionality of the Ohio

voucher program; however, the majority did contribute to the evolutionary process

of constitutional interpretation by further explaining the tenets set forth in previous

cases. There has been a noticeable, recent increase in the court’s willingness to
uphold government actions that are becoming progressively closer to the absolute

minimum prohibition set forth in the Establishment Clause. This change does not
signify a deviation from the path of evolution of the tests, but rather a deviation

towards the political “right” on the Court’s bench and the increased influence of
textualist constitutional philosophy. The more politically liberal courts have
traditionally preferred an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that widened

the gap between church and state, often employing a more experientialist
framework. As the Supreme Court has become more politically conservative, the

interpretation of the Establishment Clause has changed, preferring a relaxed

interaction between church and state. No matter how liberal or conservative it
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may become, though, the Supreme Court will always protect the minimal religious
freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment.

While textualism is usually associated with political conservatism, this is

not always the case and was not completely accurate in Zelman. The justices in
the majority took a number of liberties in their contributions to the evolution of

Establishment Clause interpretive standards by allowing a program to stand that
arguably violates the actual wording and framers’ intent of the First Amendment.

Conversely, the dissenters in Zelman, the more politically liberal of the Supreme
Court justices, appear to rely on textualist philosophy and implore the majority to
abide by the principles set forth in Everson and subsequent cases on matter of
church and state. These deviations from expected philosophical behavior indicate
that Establishment Clause conflicts may hinge more on political ideologies than on

constitutional methodologies. The development of interpretive tests and standards

becomes all the more important in this atmosphere of judicial uncertainty,

especially since the political leaning of the Court can swing quickly and

drastically.
Court watchers must remember that Zelman v. Simmons-Harris was

decided by the slimmest of margins. The five-to-four majority opinion could very
easily be overturned by just one retirement and appointment to the Court.
Considering the high average age of current justices, changes in the voting

composition of the Court in the near future are extremely likely. Also, the most

enduring Establishment Clause cases have relied on solid majorities, such as the
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eight-to-one majority in Lemon v. Kurtzman and the six-to-three majority in

Committee ofPublic Education v. Nyquist.1 Furthermore, the four dissenting
justices of John Paul Stevens, Steven Breyer, David Souter, and Ruth Bader
Ginsberg have formed a formidable moderate-to-liberal bloc and have consistently

voted together on matters of religion, abortion, and affirmative action. The same
cannot be said of the five justices in the majority, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
and Justice Anthony Kennedy occasionally side with the Zelman dissenters,

leaving Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice

Clarence Thomas in the minority.1
23The dissenters in the Zelman case appear

unwilling to accept this court’s decision and will most likely continue their dissent
until the court’s composition favors their belief, just as Justice O’Connor did when

she labored to have her “Endorsement” version of the ““Lemon Test”” move from
the minority to the majority. It is very unlikely that the four dissenting justices

will ever apply Zelman v. Simmons-Harris to future rulings, but rather, they will
use future opinions to continue their attack on Zelman’s slim majority. Believing
that “doctrinal bankruptcy has been reached”4, the four dissenting justices will

ensure that the Zelman decision will not enjoy the benefits of stare decisis, as they
believe that stare decisis has already been violated, beginning with Agostini v.

Felton in 1997 and ending with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in 2002.

1 Fried, Charles. “Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case.” Harvard Law Review. The

Harvard Law Review Association, November 2002. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 163. p. 7.
2Ibid. p. 9
3 Ibid. p. 10
4 Ibid. p. 1
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The evolution of the Establishment Clause is just that, an evolution. With

all the passions that surround the religious clauses of the First Amendment, it is
unlikely that this evolution is near its interpretive end. The five justices in the

majority in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris did not violate this evolution; they only
furthered the process. Equally, the four dissenting justices in Zelman are quite

justified in their staunch, oppositional dissent. These justices have formed
something of a Neo-Four Horsemen (and women) on the Court, and it would not

be difficult to imagine them in the majority in the near future. The debate on the
meaning of the Establishment Clause will continue as strong as ever, especially
with challenges to faith-based initiatives on the horizon. Also, until a more solid
majority is reached with regard to school vouchers, it is unlikely that more states

or the federal government will purse school voucher programs because they are on
such shaky legal ground. The possibility of such programs being overturned by a
future Supreme Court ruling is very real. Until stare decisis can once again be

firmly established in Establishment Clause interpretation, the Zelman case will

probably remain more of an academic and judicial exercise than a “green light” for
sweeping policy change in the area of education.
In my opinion, the ruling of the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris is

constitutionally sound based on the evolution of Establishment Clause interpretive
tests. I do believe, however, that school vouchers are constitutional on only the

slimmest of margins. The argument of government neutrality and free, private
choice are slightly more viable than the dissenters’ opposition to them. It was
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surprising to see the more traditionally politically conservative justices take fairly

experientialist positions in their opinions. Justice Thomas, traditionally a
textualist, considered the public good of school vouchers as much as their
constitutionality. He quotes Frederick Douglas in the final sentence of his

concurring opinion, saying, “no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long

benighted people, than giving to them, as we are here earnestly this day
endeavoring to do, the means of an education.”1 It was equally fascinating to see

traditionally experiential justices rely heavily on stare decisis and framers’ intent

in their arguments again the Court’s ruling.
I have not formed an opinion as to the practical worth of school vouchers,
but I do share some of Justice Souter’s fears about government funding of

religious institutions and the potential for corruption of doctrine and the

compromise of freedom. If school vouchers become a vehicle for government to
control religion or limit freedom, then their constitutionality should be

reevaluated. However, I believe that the concept of school vouchers in their
current form satisfy at least the minimal requirements of the Establishment Clause
using any method of interpretive philosophy, and are therefore constitutional. The

benefits and evils of school vouchers, then, should be decided in the halls of state
legislatures and the Congress, rather than in the chambers of courthouses and the

Supreme Court. Whether they are successful in facilitating improvements in
education or not, school vouchers should at least be a legislative option. It will be
1 Justice Clarence Thomas in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, p. 30.
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interesting to see how states will use this new educational opportunity made

available by the Zelman ruling. I believe that the evolution of interpretive

standards for the Establishment Clause is far from over and that the slightest of
shifts in the composition of the Court can and will affect the durability of Zelman

v. Simmons-Harris.
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